Zsolt Darvas (Ινστιτούτο Bruegel): Μισογεμάτο ή μισοάδειο το ποτήρι για την Ελλάδα;

28.11.12

Μια ιδιαίτερα ενδιαφέρουσα οικονομική αλλά και ταυτόχρονα πολιτική ανάλυση του οικονομολόγου Zsolt Darvars φιλοξενεί το Ινστιτούτο Bruegel, προσδίδοντας της προστιθέμενη αξία.

Ο νεαρός οικονομολόγος, ο οποίος έχει...



...ασχοληθεί εκτεταμένα με την ελληνική υπόθεση, εκτιμά ότι υπάρχουν δυο αναγνώσεις για τη συμφωνία που κατέληξε το Eurogroup για την Ελλάδα:


  • There is no clarity about the details of the buy-back initiative, apart from the wish to conduct it at prices not higher than the market prices of 23 November 2012 (which were between 25 and 34 cents to the euro for the various maturity new Greek bonds; see the annex of my paper for details about the new Greek bonds). Since the new Greek bonds are under the English law and are safeguarded with a co-financing agreement with EFSF, the incentives for bond holders to sell their holdings at such low prices would likely be low. The IMF conditioned its continued support to Greece on the success of the buy-back initiative, among others.
  • Also, the earlier 120 percent of GDP debt target by 2020 has proved to be inadequate for restoring trust and thereby limiting the probability of a Greek euro exit. A reiteration of a similar target is unlikely to help, as I argued here. That could just prolong economic and social misery and the uncertainty about Greek euro membership.
But there is a second reading of deal as well.
  • European lenders expressed their strong determination to keep Greece inside the euro area and suggested considering “further measures and assistance” when Greece will reach a primary surplus, conditional on the fulfilment of the financial assistance programme conditions. This could improve market sentiment and thereby support a quick rebound in output, because deep contractions used to be followed by quick recoveries and the Greek GDP has collapsed by almost a quarter.
To κακό είναι ότι ο ίδιος εκτιμά ότι θα συμβεί το χειρότερο από τα δυο, κάτι που μπορεί να οδηγήσει στην πτώση της κυβέρνησης συνεργασίας:

Which of the two readings will be shared by the private sector? My fear is that the first one will dominate. In that case, as I argued earlier, investment could be deterred further, the gradual capital outflow could continue, economic performance could remain weak, employment could fall further, and the social pressure on the government and the parliament could increase. In the wake of a prolonged contraction, the current coalition government may collapse, leading to domestic political paralysis and the chain of events leading to a euro-exit with disastrous consequences inside and outside Greece.

Ολόκληρη η ανάλυση του εδώ.